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Abstract—Payment channel networks (PCN) enable scalable
blockchain transactions without fundamentally changing the
underlying distributed ledger algorithm. However, routing a pay-
ment via multiple channels in a PCN requires locking collateral
for potentially long periods of time. Adversaries can abuse this
mechanism to conduct denial-of-service attacks. Previous work
on denial-of-service attacks focused on source routing, which is
unlikely to remain a viable routing approach as these networks
grow.
In this work we examine the effectiveness of attacks in
PCNs that use routing algorithms based on local knowledge,
where compromised intermediate nodes delay or drop transac-
tions to create denial-of-service. We focus on SpeedyMurmurs
as a representative of such protocols. Our attack simulations
show that SpeedyMurmurs is resilient to attacks by randomly
selected intermediate nodes because it dynamically adjusts using
local knowledge. We further consider attackers that control a
significant fractions of paths and we show that this ability to
route around problematic regions becomes insufficient for such
attackers. We propose methods to incentivize payment channel
networks with less central nodes and more diverse paths and
show through simulation that these methods effectively mitigate
the identified denial-of-service attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Payment channel networks such as Lightning [35] are the
predominant solution to scaling blockchains without funda-
mentally changing the underlying consensus algorithm [19].
At their core, they rely on the concept of a payment channel,
wherein two parties who wish to perform transactions off-
the-ledger put funds in escrow dedicated to such operations.
For parties that do not directly share a channel, payment
channel networks facilitate transactions by forwarding the
payment along one [35] or multiple [38], [26], [39] paths in
the graph created by all existing direct payment channels. The
chosen paths need to have the necessary funds to complete the
transaction. The process of finding suitable paths is referred
to as routing, as an analogy to routing in networks, with the
caveat that the main goal here is completion of the payment.
Routing payments along one or multiple paths proceeds
in two phases: First, all involved nodes commit to making a
payment to their successor on the path. Such a commitment
implies that they lock the funds required for the payment as
collateral. As a consequence, these funds are not available for
any concurrent payments. Second, the payments are finalized.
If the payment fails, the collateral is released after a timeout.
These timeouts tend to be in the order of minutes or even
hours, e.g., for Lightning, 40 Bitcoin blocks in the future from
the current block number at the start of the transaction or more
than 6 hours 1. Adversarial parties can abuse this mechanism
for a denial-of-service attack. By forcing collateral to remain
locked in a maximal number of channels for long periods, they
can drastically reduce the funds available for other concurrent
payments. As a consequence, concurrent payments can fail due
to a lack of available funds [37], [34]. Such an attack is called
a griefing attack [40].
Griefing attacks have been explored on their own and in
combination with other attacks [34], [37], [30]. Previous
works have two key limitations: i) they focus on single-path
source routing, i.e., the sender of the payment unilaterally
decides upon a path, and ii) they focus on attackers initiating
payments rather than affecting existing payments. For such an
attack, only the source of the payment is controlled by the
attacker and no intermediate node is involved in the attack.
Initiating payments for an attack is both more costly and more
likely to raise suspicions due to a high amount of (failed)
payments originating from the same source.
While source routing is the current algorithm for the
Lightning network, it is unlikely to remain the algorithm of
choice as network usage increases. Not only does source
routing require storing a snapshot of the global topology at
each node, it also prevents intermediary nodes from adjusting
the path if a channel does not have sufficient funds, thus
leading to routing failures even in the absence of attacks [39].
Maintaining information about the available funds of every
channel at the source is unfeasible in a large network, not least
of all because each successful transaction entails changes in
the available funds of one or more channels. A single snapshot
of the Lightning Network’s topology is about 4.2 MB for a
network with only 2337 nodes 2. A simple linear extrapolation
suggests that for a network of one million nodes, each node
would require 1.5 GB of storage, too large for many clients.
This estimate is based on the assumption that the network is
scale-free, which Rohrer et al. [37] have shown the Lightning
Network to be. In scale-free networks, the average degree is
constant, so the number of channels grows linearly. If payment
channel networks, indeed, settle thousands of transactions per
second, broadcasting these changes to all nodes creates both
unacceptable overhead and most likely out-of-date information
that leads to more failures.
To overcome the limitations of source routing, routing
algorithms purely based on local information have been de-
veloped [24], [38]. Such approaches allow intermediaries to
1https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/
07-routing-gossip.md
2https://gitlab.tu-berlin.de/rohrer/discharged-pc-data/tree/master/snapshots
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choose suitable channels based on the currently available
funds. However, giving more power to intermediate nodes also
opens these routing algorithms to denial-of-service attacks.
Prior work did not evaluate the effect of denial-of-service
attacks on such routing algorithms. Given the severity of such
attacks for source routing, it is essential to evaluate them in
the context of alternative routing algorithms before considering
deployment.
In this work, we focus on attacks against local routing
algorithms in payment channel networks, where the attacker
is an intermediate node on payment paths. More precisely,
we perform two versions of a denial-of-service attack on
SpeedyMurmurs [38], a routing algorithm based on local in-
formation, which is considered the most promising alternative
to source routing [19]. The first version of our attack performs
griefing by delaying the payment without causing a failure.
In the second variant, the attacker drops the payment entirely.
All attacks are performed by intermediaries rather than the
source, with the intermediaries being selected either randomly
or strategically based on their position in the network. Note that
even with SpeedyMurmurs’s threat model, attackers cannot
be prevented from learning the topology as in all currently
deployed PCNs, channel opening and closing are recorded on
the blockchain. In contrast to source routing, SpeedyMurmurs’
ability to let intermediaries detect and avoid channels with
blocked collateral should leave it more resistant to such attacks.
We show that SpeedyMurmurs’ performance degrades
slowly when attackers drop or grief payments. However, by
using publicly available information about the graph connec-
tivity as defined by the payment channels, the attack can be
improved significantly. Indeed, by selecting as attackers, the
0.1% of nodes with the highest betweenness centrality, we
cause as many failures as if a full 30% of nodes in the network
were selected randomly.
Based on the observation that centrality drastically in-
creases the impact of the attacker, we hypothesize that a
network topology offering high diversity, in terms of centrality,
is more resilient to strategic attacks. We validate the above
hypothesis by evaluating the attacks in a small-world network
with homogeneous node centralities and discuss incentives for
nodes to move the existing payment channel networks towards
a more suitable topology.
A side outcome of our work is also a methodology and
algorithms for creating configurable and widely applicable
datasets for evaluating payment channel routing algorithms.
The existent datasets are missing information [36] or are
based on real-world datasets from different applications such
as credit networks or credit card payments [38], [37], [5],
[39] whose applicability is unclear. In contrast, our method
offers a range of options for creating the underlying network
graph, selecting transaction values, denoting pairs of parties
performing transactions, and assigning initial balances for the
channels in the graph.
In summary, our contributions are:
• A method for generating data sets for payment channel
networks that considers a wide range of parameters
and that is applicable to studying problems in PCNs,
beyond security.
• A design of dropping and griefing attacks specific to
local routing with intermediaries as attackers.
• A simulation-based evaluation of the proposed at-
tacks revealing that high-centrality nodes allow for
highly effective attacks. To facilitate the simulation
we implemented concurrent transactions support in the
SpeedyMurmurs simulator.
• A defense mechanism based on incentivizing users
to establish new channels that diversify the available
routing paths.
II. PAYMENT CHANNEL NETWORKS
In this section, we provide more details about payment
channel networks (PCN), and other components of PCN design
such as collaterization, transaction fees and routing.
A. Payment Channels
A payment channel defines the relationship between two
parties who wish to perform monetary transactions in a com-
mon digital currency. In the most general form, a channel is
defined by the two parties that establish it and the amount
of funds that they make available for transactions to each
other. There are three operations that can be performed on
each payment channel: i) opening the channel, ii) performing
transactions, and iii) closing the channel.
Open channel. The channel balance is initially established
by a channel open operation. This operation may be a verified
operation as in the case of the Bitcoin’s [31] Lightning
Network [35] or Ethereum’s [45] Raiden Network [1], where
channel creation is a blockchain transaction that uses smart
contracts to hold the party’s funds in escrow, or it may be
based on trust as in credit networks, such as [43], [29], [9],
[17], [27]. Payment channels may be either bidirectional or
unidirectional. We focus on bidirectional payments channels,
i.e. payments can be sent in either direction. An example for
a payment channel network can be found in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: A payment channel network.
Perform transaction. A transaction in a payment channel
is initiated by one party, referred to as the sender proposing
a new balance of the channel to the other party, referred to
as the recipient. The balance is the amount of funds that both
parties agree is available on the channel. There are a number of
mechanisms that enable secure transactions on a channel [19].
They all require at least the sender to sign the transaction
with their secret key. In bidirectional channels, they typically
require doubly signed transactions, meaning recipient signs
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after sender. In order to enable parties to determine the latest
state of the channel, sender and recipient either revoke old
states [35] or include a timestamp or sequence number [8].
Close channel. Either party on the channel can decide to
close the channel. Several proposals have made on how to close
a channel [19]. At a high level, they all try to prevent parties
from claiming incorrect channel balances. When one party, A,
wants to either close the channel or resolve a dispute about
the current balance with the other party, B, A posts the latest
state of the channel, e.g., on the blockchain for the Lightning
Network. If the transaction meets the conditions for releasing
the funds, then the channel is closed and the funds are paid
out according to the balance of the submitted transaction. B
has the possibility to submit an alternative latest state within a
grace period 3. Due to revocation or versioning, it is possible to
tell which state is the correct one [19]. If one party attempted
to post an incorrect state, they can be penalized up to the total
balance of the channel [35].
Example: An analog example of a payment channel is a
coffee shop gift card which represents a way that the coffee
shop can grant the purchaser of the card some amount of credit
which can only be redeemed at that coffee shop. Opening the
channel is the analog of the coffee drinker purchasing the gift
card. Performing transactions is just like spending the gift card;
when the owner of the card buys a coffee for $X using the
gift card, both him and the coffee shop are agreeing that the
gift card balance is X less than it previously was. Closing the
channel is equivalent to the coffee drinker receiving cash from
the coffee shop in exchange for the remaining balance on the
gift card.
B. Payment Channel Networks
An open payment channel requires at least one party to
either escrow funds or allot credit—depending whether this is
a true credit network or a network which requires proof of
funds. Escrowing funds deprives the escrower of some degree
of liquidity, whereas allotting credit entails some degree of
risk. As a result, the number of channels that a party is willing
or able to open is limited. Payment channel networks were
proposed to facilitate payments between parties who do not
have a direct channel between them. If one considers the
parties and the channels between them as a graph, then as
long as a path with enough liquidity exists between two parties,
they can perform transactions without having a direct channel
by performing a series of pairwise transactions along each
channel on the path. Depending on the implementation, there
are various mechanisms in place to guarantee atomicity so that
either all of the pairwise transactions succeed, or none of them
do. A brief note on semantics: we will follow the convention
of Bagaria et al. [5] and use the term payment to indicate the
high-level task that a user might wish to accomplish, and the
term transaction to mean the components that make up that
payment; these components include individual hops along a
single path and also payment splits in multi-path routing.
Atomic payments with HTLC. A common method for
achieving atomicity employs a tailored type of two-phase
3at least 40 blocks, or close to 7h, for the Lightning network
according to https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/
07-routing-gossip.md
commit called a Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC) [35]. In
a simple HTLC with only one payment path, the recipient
chooses a random value, r, then computes h(r) for a preimage-
resistant hash function, h, and sends h(r) to the sender. During
routing, each subsequent pair, (U, V ), of nodes on the path
initiates a smart contract stating that U will pay V a certain
amount, if V reveals a preimage to h(r) within a certain time.
We refer to this process as the commitment phase. After all
these commitments have been made, the payment phase starts:
recipient reveals the preimage, r, to its predecessor on the
path. The predecessor makes the payment to recipient and
forwards the preimage to its own predecessor to claim the
payment. This process continues until all partial payments have
been completed. Some routing algorithms split payments into
chunks and route those smaller payments along multiple paths
to increase privacy or performance [39], [38], [24]. There exist
extended versions of HTLCs that guarantee atomicity when
using multiple paths [33], [26], i.e., that ensure either all split
payments succeed or none.
Collateralization. Not all paths through the network are
equivalent in terms of latency and bandwidth. A transaction’s
path may differ not only in the number of hops linking the
sender and recipient, but also in the length of the physical links
that connect the nodes in the path. On top of this discrepancy in
physical link length, the physical links may differ in bandwidth
or latency. As a result of these concerns, a situation could arise
where a transaction that is in-progress can have its promised
funds preempted by a faster transaction that shares at least one
channel with it.
As a countermeasure to preemption, a node that is routing
a transaction, t, on one of its links can reserve an amount
equal to vt, the amount of the transaction. This is known as
collateral. As long as a node keeps track of how much of its
liquid funds are locked up in collateral and doesn’t renege on
its promise to reserve the funds for t, no transaction will ever
get preempted. All PCNs use some form of collateralization. 4
The most common form of collateralization is strict collateral,
where the amount of funds that are reserved on a channel is
equal to the amount of the transaction, vt.
C. Routing Algorithms
Finding payment paths is one of the core challenges of
PCNs. Several algorithms have been proposed with different
properties and goals [35], [36], [25], [24], [38], [39], [10].
Many of the algorithms use source routing [35], [36], [25],
[24], [38], [39], [10]. Of the remaining algorithms, Flare [36]
seems unable to deal with network dynamics and Celer [10]
has not been evaluated for more than 100 nodes. The only
algorithms based on local information with a in-depth analysis
are SilentWhispers [24] and SpeedyMurmurs [38]. Both algo-
rithms provide various privacy properties and SpeedyMurmurs
shows a considerably better performance [38].
Hence, we choose SpeedyMurmurs for our attack investi-
gation and use Ford-Fulkerson as a baseline. Ford-Fulkerson
makes a good baseline for the success ratio, however, it
4There is another notion in PCNs that is also called collateral; this is used
in some networks like Lightning to refer to the funds that have been escrowed
on the blockchain as a part of channel opening, we will not be referring to
collateral in this sense.
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results in an unacceptably high overhead to be a suitable algo-
rithm [38]. In the following, we describe the two algorithms
in detail.
SpeedyMurmurs. One of the state-of-the-art algorithms
for finding paths in a PCN is SpeedyMurmurs [38]. Speedy-
Murmurs is a privacy-preserving routing algorithm based on
local knowledge; it consists of three stages. In the first stage,
n spanning trees are created. The number of spanning trees
corresponds to the number of paths a payment can use.
Increasing the number of spanning trees may improve the
success ratio and privacy properties, but comes at a cost of
performance as overhead operations will increase as well.
In the second stage, which can be interleaved with the span-
ning tree generations, nodes construct a network embedding
for each spanning tree, i.e., each node receives a coordinate
for each spanning tree based on its position in the respective
tree. These coordinates enable defining a distance between two
nodes, U and V , that corresponds to the length of the path
when restricted to the spanning tree.
In the third stage, transactions are routed through the
network. The routing algorithm first splits the payment into
n randomly-sized shares and then routes each of them along a
different spanning tree. Using the coordinates for the respec-
tive spanning tree, nodes forward the payment to neighbors
closer to the recipient according to the coordinate distance.
Note that this path-finding algorithm does not need to follow
only spanning tree channels; a node should choose its direct
neighbor that is closest to the recipient node, which might not
be a parent or child in the spanning tree. Channel balances
are decreased by the value of the payment that is routed on
them. If the balance of a channel reaches zero and that channel
is part of a spanning tree, then the channel is removed from
all spanning trees. The affected trees are adapted locally by
choosing alternative channels; this process is called rebalanc-
ing. Rebalancing is only triggered by a balance reaching zero,
and will not take place as a result of network errors or delays.
Ford-Fulkerson. We use the Ford-Fulkerson path-finding
algorithm as a baseline because it establishes an upper bound
on how routing in a PCN could perform with regards to the
volume of transaction values. In general, we expect Ford-
Fulkerson to be more resilient to attacks, because given any
state of the balances in the network, Ford-Fulkerson will be at
least as effective as any other path-finding algorithm at finding
one or multiple paths between sender and recipient.
We consider the following implementation of Ford-
Fulkerson, tailored for PCNs. First, we find the shortest path
between the sender and the recipient, p, in the network, G.
The most common algorithms for this are breadth-first search
and depth-first search; we opt for the former, which is called
Edmonds-Karp when integrated with Ford-Fulkerson [12]. Us-
ing breadth-first search made the most sense for us, because we
don’t require knowing all possible paths through the network.
As soon as we have found a shortest path, we can stop
and move on to the next step. This next step is to calculate
the maximum transaction value that can be routed along the
previously found path. The maximum value is defined the
as the minimum of the largest transaction values that each
channel on the path can support, m. If the transaction value,
v, is less than m, then we can route the full transaction,
v, along p. If v is greater than m, then we recalculate the
channel balances in p by subtracting m from each channel.
For this subtraction, the sign of m depends on the direction
that the channel is oriented. The goal of this subtraction is to
decrease the available balance after a transaction of value m
is routed across it. The subtraction along the channels in p
results in a residual network, G′. The value that remains to
be transacted, v′, is now set to v −m. We then loop back to
the first step of the algorithm using G′ for G, and v′ for v.
The algorithm ends when either a set of paths with sufficient
balances to route the full transaction value is found, or there
are no paths connecting the sender and recipient through the
residual network. If the former is the case, we consider the
transaction to have completed successfully, otherwise it is
considered a failure.
D. PCN System Goals
We identify the following necessary goals that a practical
payment system has to meet in order to be adopted.
Path Finding. If a single path or a set of multiple paths
connecting a sender and recipient exists and has sufficient
balances, there must exist routing algorithms that can find these
paths.
Integrity. If payment is completed, then the balances of
the intermediate channels along the payment path(s) must
be decreased by the value of the payment routed on them,
including any routing fees.
Collateral. Reserved collateral cannot be used except by
the transaction that reserved it. If there is not enough guaran-
teed balance available on a particular channel, the transaction
must find an alternate channel or fail.
Accountability. A dishonest participant is not able to claim
a false channel balance.
Availability. A PCN must continue executing arriving pay-
ments without downtime or significant performance reduction
in the face of user errors or attackers. If the system does
not offer some degree of availability guarantees, then it will
not be adopted in practice. Availability cannot be trivially
provided [18].
As stated above, local routing algorithms are needed to in-
crease the scalability of payment channel networks. However,
none of the existing local algorithms has been evaluated in
terms of providing availability in the presence of adversarial
nodes. Maintaining a high degree of availability in the pres-
ence of attacks is of the utmost importance, hence our work
focuses on providing the necessary evaluation of local routing
algorithms in the presence of attacks.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST PCNS
In this section we describe our threat model and attacks
we consider in this work.
A. Threat Model
Computation capabilities. We consider an internal, active,
colluding attacker that is computationally bounded. More
precisely, the attacker has powerful computational resources
but cannot break cryptographic primitives.
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Collusion. An attacker can create arbitrarily many nodes
that they fully control, and they are able to corrupt formerly
honest nodes through means such as social engineering. At-
tacker nodes are geographically distributed in arbitrary loca-
tions and collude with each other. Colluding nodes communi-
cate out-of-band, which might be faster than PCN information.
Thus, we assume that an attacker node is aware of any
information gathered by other adversarial parties. As motivated
in previous work, nodes that are created by the attacker may be
arbitrarily connected to other nodes in the network, even those
controlled by honest participants [4], [14]. However, they have
no access to an honest node’s locally stored information.
Attacker knowledge (topology, initial channel balances).
As is common in PCNs, an attacker is aware of the complete
network topology, which includes all connections and their
initial capacities, but not any transactions or the capacities
changed by transactions. While the attacker is aware of the
initial balances, it may not have up-to-date information about
the available balances on channels to which it is not directly
connected. This is because while the initial balance of a
channel is public information that is published when the
channel is opened, transactions between two connected parties
can change the channel balance without publishing updates
(unless an update is disputed or the channel is closed). Thus,
a node can never be sure of the balance of a channel it is not
part of. Rather, it can only say that it is between zero and
the total capacity of the channel. This is an expanded threat
model from that of SpeedyMurmurs [38]. SpeedyMurmurs is
considered one of the most promising alternatives to source
routing [19], and therefore realistic attacks, as described in
this paper, must be evaluated on it before adoption can be
considered.
Attacker placement. The placement of attackers in the
network can be categorized as either on-path or off-path. An
attacker is defined to be on-path if a payment channel for
which it is one of the endpoints is a channel along the path(s)
that a payment takes through the network between the sender
and the recipient. An on-path attacker has the ability to directly
interfere with messages and transactions sent over its channels.
Alternatively, an attacker is considered off-path if the payment
does not require any transactions over the attacker’s channels.
An off-path attacker may still be able to impact transaction, or
the network as a whole, by sending its own payments along
certain paths or crafting the payments in particular ways.
B. Adversary Goals
There are several reasons why an adversary might wish
to perform an attack on a PCN. One such motivation would
be for financial gain. In one scenario, an attacker wants to
attract payments to their own nodes to collect routing fees,
or alternatively, prevent others from collecting routing fees.
Another form of adversary seeks to attack the PCN as a whole,
in order to deter users from transacting on the PCN and instead
opt for another type of payment service.
C. Attack Design
Attacks consist of three aspects: attacker placement, at-
tacker actions, and attacked transactions.
1) Attacker Placement in the Network Topology: An at-
tacker creates or corrupts nodes according to a selection algo-
rithm that best advances their agenda. Ersoy et al. [14] have
shown that Lightning nodes are willing to accept connections
from anyone willing to escrow their own funds, therefore a
node may also insert itself into an arbitrary location in the
topology by creating such connections. A node could also be
corrupted by social engineering, malware, or by other attacks
dependent on the security of the targeted nodes. Selection algo-
rithms of interest are discussed below, many of which could be
combined into additional hybrid approaches. This is a different
concept than Rohrer et al. [37] who do not consider attacker
locations in the topology, only victim locations, which is a less
powerful attacker model because their attackers are forced to
create cryptographic evidence of their own malfeasance as a
result of flooding the network with payments. Their model
also requires enough capital to pay for the routing fees of the
flooded payments.
Random. In this scenario, node’s location in the graph has
no bearing on the liklihood of that node being selected as
an attacker; all nodes are equally likely to be selected. This
method requires no knowledge about the network topology by
the attacker, and is used a baseline in our evaluation. To the
best of our knowledge, this basic selection mechanism has not
be evaluated before.
Graph-oriented. There are many ways to quantify a node’s
position within a graph e.g. connectivity, centrality [16], com-
municability [15], etc. An attacker could choose to optimize
for one or several of these properties, and choose their lo-
cation in the graph accordingly. Of particular interest to us is
betweenness centrality [16], which for a specific node, z, is the
ratio of shortest paths between every pair of nodes that include
z. The betweenness centrality cb(z) of node, z, is given by
cb(z) =
∑
s,r,z∈N
σsrz
σsr
where σsr is the total number of shortest paths between s
and r, and σsrz is the number of shortest paths between s and
r that include z.
Balance-oriented. In this case, nodes whose channels
have a high aggregate sum of available balances are more
likely to be selected. These balances can either be incoming
or outgoing, as either one implies that a large volume of
transactions could be supported. Even a node that does not
have many connections might still find itself as a part of many
routes if it has enough credit to support many payments.
Rate-oriented. Nodes are selected based on the ratio of
incoming and outgoing balances. We assume that a channel’s
initial balance reflects its intended use, and therefore an
incoming/outgoing balance ratio close to one suggests that
transactions flowing into and out of the node will be balanced.
Imbalanced flows can lead to balance depletion [39], [23] that
requires intervention to resolve. A balanced flow implies that a
node will be operational for longer and may therefore support
higher throughput.
Routing algorithm-oriented. Many routing algorithms
have distinct structures that an attacker might be able to
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exploit. The location of a node within a structure may im-
pact its likelihood of being a part of a route. For example,
SpeedyMurmurs is based on spanning trees [38], so selecting
one of the tree roots might yield a more effective attacker that
is involved in more transactions.
2) (On-path) Attacker Actions: We consider insider attacks,
and we are primarily interested in intermediary nodes on the
path as they are less detectable. There are various actions an
attacker could take when it is on-path. This is in contrast to
Rohrer et al. [37] who fully remove their selected nodes from
the topology, whereas our selected nodes perform malicious
actions, which are harder to detect.
Dropping. An attacker could simply drop a transaction that
it should forward to the next node in a multi-hop payment.
More maliciously, the attacker could refuse to forward the
transaction, but still send a confirmation that the transaction has
been forwarded to the previous node on the path. If a transac-
tion is dropped during the commitment phase (Section II-B), all
previous hops would need to maintain their locked collateral
until the HTLC (or similar mechanism) expires. We follow
Miller et al. [28] in assuming that that a rational investor’s
preference is to obtain and use money now rather than later,
and therefore a forced restriction on using one’s own money
constitutes an attack. Locked collateral also cannot be used
to route other transactions that may have a higher chance
at succeeding, and thereby deprives the collateral holder of
the potential revenue from fees. Note that dropping is not
be performed during the payment phase (Section II-B) by a
rational attacker, because then they would be forced to pay
their guaranteed funds to the node one hop closer to the
recipient but, in dropping, would not be reimbursed from the
node one hop closer to the sender.
Griefing by delaying. A node can wait to forward a
payment to the next node until some specified amount of
time has passed or some condition is met. For example,
one such condition could be to wait until just before the
transaction times out before forwarding it. Doing so will
allow the payment to complete, but would force collateral
to be locked up for the maximum amount of time which, as
stated previously, constitutes an attack. Performing this attack
inconsistently, e.g., on only 50% of transactions, would also
make it difficult to detect because of its similarity to network
delays. This has a similar effect to payment griefing [40], in
which an attacker sends payments to colluding nodes that then
delay and drop the transaction. Our version is more general,
however, because any node on the transaction path can grief
by delaying, whereas in traditional griefing, a transaction has
to be addressed to the griefing node.
Incorrect forwarding. An attacker could pass a payment
to a node other than that which is specified by the routing
algorithm. The effect that this action might have depends of
the implementation. As nodes in most PCN implementations
are authenticated by their public keys, a node will be unable to
complete a payment along an unintended route if the routing
algorithm uses source routing. In the source routing case,
this would be similar to dropping the payment but would be
easier to detect because honest nodes would quickly realize
that they are being told to forward payments that should not
have included them in the first place. In dynamic routing, an
attacker may be able to force a payment to choose a longer
path through the network. It is generally not possible to change
the final recipient of a payment, something ensured by HTLCs
and their ilk.
Replaying. An attacker can send a transaction that has
already been sent. This could be a transaction that is currently
being executed or one that was executed in the past. The goal
of this is to cause a transaction to be executed twice. To guard
against such attacks, implementations should use sequence
numbers on transaction and each node should keep a local
store of sequence numbers it has seen.
3) (Off-path) Attacker Actions: Flooding. An attacker
could send many small or large payments to a colluding
attacker node. This could cause many of the same issues as
griefing by delaying, such as locking up collateral. It also
can cause channel balances to become depleted more quickly
However, its effects can be hard to control in a dynamic routing
setting. In other words, an attacker cannot isolate [30], [37] a
targeted node, because the path that will be taken is not known
ahead of time.
4) Attacked Transactions: An attacker may not wish to
perform its malicious actions on every possible transaction,
for instance, they might target a subset of transactions to avoid
suspicion. The following is a list of strategies that an attacker
can employ when selecting a set of transactions to attack.
Random. Flip an n-sided coin, and perform attack based
on the flip result. This could be very difficult to detect.
Payment value. Perform action based on the transactions’
size, e.g., only drop large payments.
Available balance. Perform action based on the available
balances along the path. This could be an attempt to force
payments off high balance paths toward lower balance paths
that may become depleted.
Destination proximity. Perform action based on how close
the attacker node is to the recipient in the network topology.
For example, if performed when the attacker is close to the
recipient then payments might be forced to find a longer path
through the network, which equates to more collateral being
locked up in transactions.
Source or destination identity. An attack might only be
performed if a transaction is originating from a certain sender
or addressed to a certain recipient. This could be the case when
an attacker knows the identity of the sender or recipient and
wishes to attack them specifically. However, such an attack is
difficult for SpeedyMurmurs, as it hides the identities of the
sender and recipient from intermediaries [38].
IV. GENERATING SYNTHETIC DATASETS
The effectiveness of PCN routing algorithms, and attacks
against them, are highly dependent on the topology, channel
balances, transactions pairs, and transaction-value distribu-
tions. We discuss limitations of existing datasets and then
describe our approach.
A. Limitations of Existing Datasets
Due to the lack of available data sets for PCNs, early
approaches [38], [24] relied on data from Ripple’s credit
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(a) Success ratio. (b) Initial balances
Fig. 2: Ripple dataset. On the left, performance of Ford-
Fulkerson and SpeedyMurmurs with sequential transactions
and no attack, on the right initial balances.
network [3] for topology, capacities, and transactions. This
dataset was collected by crawling the Ripple network, taking
note of which accounts are funded , i.e., can make payments
to other accounts, and removing inconsistencies that may
have arisen from ignoring certain Ripple-specific features, like
currency exchange by intermediaries. Early approaches not
based on Ripple do not consider transaction and capacity
distributions at all [36].
Unfortunately, the Ripple dataset has a very small ratio of
transactions that are successful as seen in Figure 2a where
we show SpeedyMurmurs and Ford-Fulkerson with sequential
transactions, i.e., when completing each transaction before
starting the next one. Performance for concurrent transactions
would be even worse. Note that previous work resolves the
issue by excluding transactions that were not successful for
Ford-Fulkerson, leading to a very limited transaction set [38].
As showin in Figure 2b, the majority of initial channel
balances are zero or very close to zero. While zero balances
make sense for a credit network, where credit corresponds
to trust and channel establishment does not come at a fee,
it is unrealistic in the context of networks such as Lightning.
Opening a channel requires paying the fees for one blockchain
transaction, which is the same regardless of the amount locked
in the channel. Thus, channels with little or no funds are
unattractive as they do not provide the opportunity to make
payments and hence users are unlikely to invest the fee for
opening them. We present further details about the Ripple
dataset in Figure 3.
After Lightning data became available, many studies relied
on the Lightning topology and capacities for their evalua-
tion [39], [37], [34], [42], [30], although some used synthetic
random graphs and scale-free topologies either as their main
dataset [5] or in addition to Lightning data [39].
The Lightning data set does not contain transactions. A
dataset for transactions requires both sender-recipient pairs and
values. Sender-recipient pairs are typically chosen uniformly at
random [5], [42], [37]. Only the evaluation of the Spider rout-
ing algorithm uses an exponential distribution [39], indicating
that few sources and destinations are very active whereas the
majority of nodes participate only occasionally. The transaction
values are modeled on real-world data that is not specific to
PCNs, e.g., Ripple transactions in [37], [5] and credit card
transactions in [39], [7].
(a) Node connections (b) Initial balances
(c) Transaction recipient (d) Transaction sender
(e) Transaction value (f) Sender/recipient pairs
Fig. 3: Ripple Dataset Characteristics.
Our data sets are different in that they allow us to vary
the expected success ratio and hence see the difference be-
tween a network whose capacity is clearly sufficient to handle
transactions and one that has a limited capacity.
B. Our Approach
A payment channel system is defined by the network graph
created by the channels between participants in the system, G,
the transactions performed between these participants, T , the
set of balances available on each channel, B, and the routing
algorithm, R, used to find payment paths; we write PC =<
G,T,B,R >. B is initialized with a set of initial balances B0.
Our high-level approach to generate datasets is as follows:
(1) Channel network: We first generate the channel net-
work, modeled as a graph G =< N,C,B >, where N is
the set of participants, C the set of channels, and B is the
set of balances on each channel. Note that B is undefined at
this point, we will assign an initial balance set B0 later. We
use scale-free graphs as they were shown to be representative
for PCNs [37] and we write G = SF (n, c), where SF is the
scale-free algorithm, n is the total number of participants and
c is a connectivity parameter that models how many channels
a party forms when first added to the graph.
(2) Transaction set: We then select a transaction set. A
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transaction is defined by a pair of sender and recipient and
the value of the transaction. We separate the selection of
the transaction pair from the selection of the value of the
transactions and write T = GT (N,nt, vfix, Dv, Dn), where
GT is our procedure of generating a transaction set and
T = {ti, ti =< si, ri, vi >} is the resulting transaction set
with si and ri as the sender and recipient, respectively, for
transaction ti of value vi. The parameters of GT are the set of
participants, N , the number of transactions, nt, sampled from
distribution Dv , vfix is an additional parameter determining
Dv (e.g. minimum, maximum, average, etc.), and Dn is the
distribution used to sample pairs of parties.
(3) Initial balance set: Finally, we generate the set of initial
balances for each channel. Our approach is to start with a
balance set of only channels with capacity 0, a given set of
transactions, and a percentage, tc, of transactions for which
we want to have the guarantee that they can be successfully
completed. We iterate over the set of transactions, and, with
probability tc, execute the routing algorithm R to find one or
several channels in the graph between sender and recipient.
For each channel along the paths returned by R, we add
the transaction value v to the balance. In this manner, we
know that there is a possibility for the transaction to be
successful. Formally, we write B0 = CIB(T,G,R, tc,mc, pc)
and B = {bi, bi = (si, ri) 7→ vi}, where CIB is our algorithm
to compute the initial balance set, T is transaction set, G
is the channel network, R is the routing algorithm and tc
is the percentage of completed transactions. In addition, we
might reduce the final channel balance by a factor, mc, to
generate a network with less liquidity. pc is the probability
of applying such a multiplier to a channel, e.g., pc = 1
indicates the multiplication is applied to all channels. We also
write Pi, Gi+1 = R(ti, Gi), where routing a transaction ti
using algorithm R on network Gi results in finding a path
Pi = {c, c =< e1, e2, b >}, and a network with updated
balances, Gi+1. For each channel in Pi, e1 and e2 are the
endpoints of the channel, and b is the value being routed
through that channel.
C. Generating Transaction Sets
Each transaction is a tuple of the transaction value, the
sender, and the recipient, with the latter two forming the
transaction pair. We treat the selection of transaction values
and transaction pairs independently.
Transaction value. We consider five distributions: con-
stant, Pareto, exponential, normal, and Poisson.
Transaction pair. We sample the sender and recipient
independently according to a distribution Dn. For this, we first
randomize the order of the nodes and then map each of them
to the index they have in this random order. We then sample
the node based on its index according to the distribution.
As these are continuous distributions and the nodes are
associated with integers, sampling requires an additional step
to map real numbers to these integers. Thus, we bound the
values returned from sampling Dn with a maximal value BP .
A node with index, i, is then chosen for all sampled values
in [i · BP, (i + 1) · BP ). The bounding parameter mentioned
previously, BP , is used to force the random selection of nodes
to fall within known bounds. A value for BP should be chosen
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for generating set of transactions T.
Input: Distributions Dv , Dn, nodes N , number of transac-
tions nt, a fixed transaction value that the distribution is
anchored on vfix, the bounding parameter BP
Output: T = {ti, ti =< si, ri, vi >, i ∈ [1..nt]}
function SAMPLENODE(Dn, N , BP )
i = b SAMPLE(Dn)×|N |/BP c
return N [i]
end function
function GT(Dv , Dn, N , nt, vfix, BP )
for all i ∈ nt do
vi := SAMPLE(Dv , vfix)
do
si := SAMPLENODE(Dn, N , BP )
ri := SAMPLENODE(Dn, N , BP )
while si = ri
end for
return ti =< si, ri, vi >
end function
such that the PDF of Dn will have decayed to zero, we use a
value of 5. The formal description of the algorithm is presented
as Algorithm 1.
D. Generating Initial Balance Set
The initial balance of a channel represents its expected
use. This assumption has several implications. First, channels
with higher balances are expected to have a higher volume of
transacted funds and vice versa for lower balances. Second, the
ratio between the balance from A → B to the balance from
B → A represents the ratio of transacted funds from A→ B
to the transacted funds from B → A.
To assign balances to channels, we used the following
methodology. We consider a PCN, which is some graph
G0 = (N = {u}, C = {(u, v)}). A transaction in a PCN can
occur between a sender, s, a recipient, r, and with a value,
v—the full transaction ti is written as (si, ri, vi). A routing
algorithm, R, is run on a graph, G, and with a transaction ti;
it returns a route, Pi, and Gi+1 = A(ti, Gi), where Pi is the
set of all channels which have been modified, and Gi+1 is the
graph after all channels are modified. The routing algorithm,
R, may return multiple paths and may also be randomized. If
a route with sufficient balances cannot be found, i.e., there is
not a high enough funds on the channels connecting si to vi,
R returns ⊥ and Gi (Gi is not modified). The modified graph,
Gi+1, is equivalent to, for each hop (a, b,m) ∈ P , either
subtracting m value from the channel (a, b) in G or adding
m value to the channel (b, a). This algorithm is formally
presented in Algorithm 2.
Reducing Graph Weights. Generating the perfect channel
balances is useful for testing the system, but to simulate
certain concurrency scenarios, we need some of the channels
to have insufficient credit to complete all of the transactions
in T . To achieve this, we simply take all edge weights in
the graph, and scale them by some multiplier, i.e. E′ =
{(u, v, k · w)}(u,v,w)∈E , where k is a constant scale factor.
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Algorithm 2 Full knowledge algorithm for determining suffi-
cient channel balances for a success ratio of 100%.
Input: Network G0 = (N = {u}, C = {(u, v)}, B),
Transaction list T = {ti, ti =< si, ri, vi >, i ∈ [1..nt]},
Routing Algorithm R, completed transaction percentage tc,
balance multiplier mc, probability of applying the multiplier
to any given channel pc
Output: Set of initial balances B0 = {bi, bi = (si, ri) 7→ vi}
maxBal = {}
for u, v ∈ C do
maxBal = {(u, v) : 0}
end for
for ti ∈ T do
if BIASEDCOINFLIP(tc) = 1 then
continue
end if
Pi, Gi = R(ti, Gi−1)
for (e1, e2, valueChange) ∈ Pi do
Gi[(e1, e2)]+ = valueChange
if (e2, e1) ∈ Gi then
minWt = MIN(Gi[(e2, e1)], Gi[(e1, e2)])
Gi[(e2, e1)]− = minWt
Gi[(e1, e2)]− = minWt
end if
maxBal[(e1, e2)] =
MAX(maxBal[(e1, e2)], Gi[(e1, e2)])
end for
end for
for (e1, e2), v ∈ maxBal do
if BIASEDCOINFLIP(pc) = 1 then
maxBal[(e1, e2)] = mc × v
end if
end for
return maxBal
We also experimented with the option of only applying the
factor k probabilistically, i.e., applying it only with probability
pc. A complementary approach for reducing the capacity of the
network is to select transactions for the generation of the initial
balance generation randomly, with probability tc.
E. Generated Datasets
We used the implementation of the Baraba´si-Albert algo-
rithm [6] for the scale-free graph generation from the Python
module networkx [20].
Datasets were generated according to the methodologies
discussed above. The particulars of each data set are shown
in Table I. The algorithm used for finding the path between
sender and recipient to increase the initial balance was always
a simple shortest path algorithm. While we experimented with
all datasets showed in the table, to present our results, we
select Dataset 25. We show the detailed characteristics of the
dataset in Figure 4.
V. METHODOLOGY
Before detailing the results, we give an overview of our
methodology, including an overview of the simulator, the
(a) Node connections (b) Initial balances
(c) Transaction recipient (d) Transaction sender
(e) Transaction value (f) Sender/recipient pairs
Fig. 4: Characteristics of Dataset 25. Details in Table I.
Name Channel Network Transaction Set Initial Balance Set
0 SF(100k, 5) GT(100k, 1m, 1, Pareto, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
6 SF(100k, 5) GT(100k, 1m, 1, Pareto, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 1)
7 SF(100k, 2) GT(100k, 1m, 1, Pareto, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%)
8 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Pareto, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 1)
10 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Pareto, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
12 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Pareto, Constant) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
13 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Poisson) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
14 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Exponential, Exponential) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
15 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Poisson) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 0.5)
16 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Normal, Normal) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
17 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Normal, Normal) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 0.5)
18 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Normal, Normal) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 0.5)
19 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Normal, Normal) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 80%, 1, 1)
20 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
21 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 30, Poisson, Normal) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
22 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Constant) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 1, 1)
23 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 0.5)
24 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 1)
25 SF(10k, 2) GT(10k, 100k, 1, Poisson, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 0.5)
26 SF(100k, 5) GT(100k, 1m, 1, Poisson, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 0.5)
32 NWS(10k, 20, 0.01) GT(10k, 100k, 1, Poisson, Pareto) CIB(T, G, shortest path, 100%, 0.5, 1, 100)
TABLE I: Description of datasets we generated and exper-
imented with. Unless otherwise stated, our simulations use
Dataset 25.
concrete implementation of the attacks, and our metrics of
interest.
Simulator. For our evaluations, we extended the sequential
transaction simulator from Roos et al. [38] to build a concur-
rent transaction simulator. We used the datasets and parameters
listed in Table I and generated using the methodology de-
scribed in Section IV. In the simulator, each channel is capable
of locking collateral for a configurable number of concurrent
transactions. This is done through the use of threading. Each
transaction is executed in a distinct thread that operates on
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a shared state in memory. Transactions arrive uniformly and
begin executing as soon as a thread is available. For each
transaction, the configured routing algorithm is executed in two
steps. First, a path is found using the methods of the configured
routing algorithm. This path discovery is done hop by hop, and
with each hop, collateral along the corresponding channel is
reserved for the current transaction, which cannot be violated
by any other concurrent transaction. To simulate the effects of
network delays, an simulated network delay of 30 milliseconds
is used for each hop during path finding. Second, when the
routing algorithm has found a path with sufficiently high
balances and has locked collateral on each channel, it can then
complete the transaction in reverse order. This payment phase
involves unlocking the collateral and updating the channels’
balances.
Not only do channel updates occur on every completed
transaction, but they also occur during collateral locking. It is
necessary to track how much collateral is locked, as locked
collateral is not available for other transactions. Thus, the
important aspect in deciding whether routing via a channel
is possible is not the balance, but the difference between the
balance and the locked collateral. Locked collateral leads to
paths being diverted by insufficient available funds or even
to failures if a path with sufficiently high available balances
cannot be found. A secondary reason for this information to be
maintained is that we need to be able to rollback transactions
that claimed some collateral but were unable to be completed
for some reason. Upon aborting such a partial transaction, the
channel must be returned to its prior state, while still retaining
any changes from any other partial or complete transaction that
may have occurred concurrently.
Results for each transaction, e.g., failure or success, are
grouped into simulated time buckets called epochs; this is
based on when the transaction was started, not when it finished.
In other words, the results for epoch i contain all transactions
initiated in epoch i, regardless of when they terminate. For
maximum time-step granularity, we consider each transaction
to be started in a distinct epoch unless stated otherwise.
Attacks We implement two types of attacks: dropping and
griefing by delaying; these are the most powerful and hardest to
detect of the attacks listed in Section III. For a dropping attack,
transactions are executed normally unless they encounter an
adversarial party on the path. If an adversary is selected as the
next hop, the payment will immediately be marked as failed
and any collateral locked for that payment will be rolled back.
For a griefing attack, upon encountering an adversary, the
transaction is delayed for a configurable amount of time. For
our simulations, we find that the ratio between attack delay
and simulated network delay is decisive, and therefore choose
a value of attack-delay to be 10 seconds. With a simulated
network delay of 30 milliseconds, the attack does not increase
in effectiveness with longer than 10 second delays. After the
delay time has elapsed, the payment is allowed to continue.
For each of these attacks, we consider two attacker placement
methods: random and highest betweenness centrality, i.e., by
the fraction of shortest paths going through a node [16].
The networkx [20] Python library was used for calculating
betweenness centrality.
In all scenarios, we vary the number of attackers. For
randomly selected attackers, that amount is varied between
0-30% of total nodes in the network. For the betweenness
centrality selection method, we vary the fraction of attackers
between 0.1-5% of nodes in the network.
A. Metrics
We consider the following metrics to gauge the effective-
ness of our attacks.
Success Ratio. This metric captures the ratio of successful
transactions to all transactions executed. A successful transac-
tion is one for which one or multiple path with sufficient funds
have been discovered and the transaction was committed along
all channels on the paths. Formally, let Pi indicate a payment
result with Pi = ⊥ indicating failure. Then for a graph, G0,
a routing algorithm, R, and a transaction set, T , consisting of
nt transactions, the success ratio of R for T on G0 is
TCR(G0, R, T ) =
1
nt
|{Pi 6= ⊥|ti ∈ T, (Pi, Gi) = R(ti, Gi−1)}|.
Transacted Value. This metric captures the values of
transactions that are completed successfully. This is useful for
identifying trends in the values of completed transactions.
TV (Ts) =
|Ts|∑
i=0
Ti.value,
where Ts is the set of all transactions that completed
successfully, and Ti.value is the value of transaction Ti.
Usually, the transacted value is computed per epoch.
Cumulative Transacted Value. This metric captures the
running total of transacted values, which can be useful for
detecting small deviations in the volume of successful trans-
actions that accrue over time.
CTV (T ) =
epochs(T )∑
e=0
TV (Te),
where epochs(T ) is the number of epochs spanned by
transaction set T , and Te is the set of all completed transactions
that started in epoch e.
VI. EVALUATION
We present results of our two attacks—griefing by delaying
and dropping, both for a random and betweenness-driven
attacker selection.
A. Random Attacker Selection
We start by describing the attack of griefing by delaying
for both SpeedyMurmurs and Ford-Fulkerson, followed by
a description of dropping. Note that our results in terms of
success ratio are considerably lower than those reported in [38]
as their data was cleaned such that all transactions are possible.
In the following, all results are presented as a running average
over 1500 epochs, unless otherwise stated.
Figure 5 shows the effect of delaying on SpeedyMurmurs’s
success ratio and transacted value. Having 5% attackers leads
10
(a) Success ratio (b) Success ratio
(c) Total transacted amount (d) Total transacted amount
(e) Cumulat. transacted values (f) Cumulat. transacted values
Fig. 5: Griefing by delaying with attackers selected randomly.
Run on Dataset 25. SpeedyMurmurs on the left and Ford-
Fulkerson on the right
to a slightly lower success ratio initially but then stabilizes
at roughly the same success ratio as a network without
adversaries. A higher fraction of attackers leads to a lower
success ratio but follows the same pattern of an initially high
success ratio dropping and then stabilizing. At some point,
the effect per additional attacker seems to be decreasing. For
instance, 30% attackers is only barely more effective than
20%. This is not surprising, because once such large swaths
of the network are controlled by attackers, most paths already
contain one adversary so that an additional attacker does not
increase the number of affected paths. Analogous results hold
for the transacted value, displayed in Figure 5c. Note that
sudden jumps in transacted value correspond to one transaction
of a high value being successful. The cumulative effect of
these attacks can be seen in Figure 5e, where the consistently
higher success ratio of simulations with less attackers translates
into an increasingly higher cumulative transacted value, as
expected.
For Ford-Fulkerson, griefing is even less effective (Fig-
ure 5). The success ratio in the presence of attackers (Fig-
ure 5b) doesn’t deviate significantly from the attacker-free case
until later epochs, and even so, it does not do so by much.
The transacted values, both per epoch and cumulatively, in
Figures 5d and 5f, respectively, are also quite consistent. This
is all to be expected, because Ford-Fulkerson can more easily
find alternate paths if one is blocked, though as discussed in
Section V, this comes at a high cost. Note that the success
ratio differs slightly between non-adversarial and adversarial
environments, as displayed in Figure 5b, but the cumulative
transacted value in Figure 5f seemingly does not. This discrep-
ancy implies that though the 0% attacker case is completing
more transactions, they are mostly small and therefore do not
impact the cumulative value much.
In a dropping attack, even Ford-Fulkerson does not pro-
vide sufficient resilience. The results of such an attack on
SpeedyMurmurs and Ford-Fulkerson, with attackers selected
randomly, can be seen in Figure 6. The difference between
the two attacks is particularly glaring in the beginning. While
griefing shows a similar drop over time as routing in non-
adversarial conditions, dropping entails a low success ratio
from the beginning. The reason lies in the fact that griefing
only affects the success ratio through additional locked-up
collateral that only becomes of relevance when the channels
start to become depleted. In contrast, dropping causes pay-
ments to fail even if balances are high. Figure 6c shows lower
transacted values across the board. This is because a dropping
attack affects all payments equally, without regard to value,
so increasing the number of attackers uniformly reduces the
number of completed payments of all sizes. This effect is also
reflected in the cumulative transacted values (Figure 6e)
From Figure 6, we see that similar results hold for Ford-
Fulkerson. Increasing the number of attackers seems to in-
crease the effectiveness of the attack on the success ratio
(Figure 6b), i.e., we do not see diminishing returns like we did
in Figure 5a. The transacted values in Figure 6d decrease as the
number of attackers increases and as time passes. The latter is
likely a result of the aforementioned balance depletion, while
the former follows naturally from an increase in the number
of attacker-occupied paths.
B. Centrality-based Attacker Selection
If the attacker has the ability to strategically choose which
nodes to corrupt, it can use the available topology information
to corrupt the nodes with the highest betweenness centrality.
Figure 7 display the effects of griefing attackers selected by
highest betweenness centrality for SpeedyMurmurs and Ford-
Fulkerson. For SpeedyMurmurs, displayed in Figure 7a, 0.1%
attackers are sufficient to reduce the success ratio to almost
zero. Given that the success ratio is already so low, additional
attackers do not considerably decrease it further. Thus, the
transacted value is nearly the same for different attacker
ratios, as can be seen in Figures 7a, 7c and 7e. Again, the
effects of griefing on Ford-Fulkerson are much less pronounced
(Figure 7).
However, Ford-Fulkerson is susceptible to a dropping
attack. The results when attackers are selected by highest
betweenness centrality can be seen in Figure 8, for both
SpeedyMurmurs and Ford-Fulkerson. Since the weaker grief-
ing attack was already shown to reduce SpeedyMurmurs’s
success ratio and transacted value to close to zero, the more
powerful dropping attack achieves essentially the same. For
Ford-Fulkerson, dropping reduces the success ratio to below
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(a) Success ratio (b) Success ratio
(c) Total transacted amount (d) Total transacted amount
(e) Cumulat. transacted values (f) Cumulat. transacted values
Fig. 6: Dropping attack with attackers selected randomly. Run
on Dataset 25. SpeedyMurmurs on the left and Ford-Fulkerson
on the right.
30% with 0.1% attackers, even though the success ratio without
attacks is close to 1 initially and then only decreases slowly, as
displayed in Figure 8b. The results translate to a low volume
of transacted values.
For comparison, we also ran our attacks on the Lightning
Network topology as it was captured on May 28, 2020 [2].
Channel balances and transactions on the Lightning Network
are private, so we generate both using the same methodology
discussed in Sections IV-C and IV-D. Before assigning the
initial channel balances, we extract the largest connected
component from the topology so we do not generate trans-
actions between unconnected pairs. The effects (Figure 9)
are consistent with previous experiments. SpeedyMurmurs
shows a degradation in success ratio between more than 20%,
while Ford-Fulkerson is mostly unaffected. These outcomes
are in-line with attacks on source routing, which indicate that
selecting central nodes as adversaries allows capturing more
than 70% of routes [42].
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
Our results indicate that selecting adversaries based on
centrality increases the impact of the attacker drastically.
Hence, it stands to reason that a network topology that does not
(a) Success ratio (b) Success ratio
(c) Total transacted amount (d) Total transacted amount
(e) Cumulat. transacted values (f) Cumulat. transacted values
Fig. 7: Griefing by delaying with attackers selected by highest
betweenness centrality. Run on Dataset 25. SpeedyMurmurs
on the left and Ford-Fulkerson on the right.
offer high diversity in terms of centrality is more vulnerable
to strategic attacks. Below, we test the above hypothesis by
evaluating the attacks in a small-world network and discuss
incentives for nodes to move the existing payment channel
networks towards a more suitable topology.
A. Generating a Small-world Network
We generate a Newman-Watts-Strogatz (NWS) net-
work [32]. This is a form of small-world world topology
where there are many clusters of highly connected cliques that
are weakly interconnected—this is the famed “six-degrees of
separation” model of social networks. We opt for the NWS
network instead of the traditional Watts-Strogatz network [44],
because the algorithm for generating the latter involves prob-
abilistically removing links which can cause the network to
become disconnected. The NWS algorithm only adds links and
is therefore guaranteed to lead to a connected network.
The parameters for the NWS algorithm are p, the probabil-
ity of a node adding a connection to a node which is not one
of its close neighbors, and k, the number of close neighbors
to connect to. We choose a value of 0.01 for p and 20 for
k. The p value was chosen based on the definition of small-
worldness [44] as having a value of p less than or equal to
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Fig. 8: Dropping attack with attackers selected by highest
betweenness centrality. Run on Dataset 25. SpeedyMurmurs
on the left and Ford-Fulkerson on the right.
0.01. The value of k was selected as a reasonable number of
connections for a node to have.
For assigning initial balances, we use Algorithm 2, with
the addendum that if a channel had a balance below some
minimum value, then increased it to that minimum value. The
reason for this lies in the high number of channels of capacity
0 that the data set had otherwise. Channels of capacity 0 are
unlikely due to the fact that opening a channel typically costs
a fee. As a minimum value, we chose 100. The distributions
of this new dataset is displayed in Figure 10.
B. Resilience of Small-world Networks
The effect of our attacks are considerably lower in a small-
world network with attackers selected by highest betweenness
centrality. For the griefing attack, the attack has almost no
impact for both SpeedyMurmurs and Ford-Fulkerson, as can be
seen in Figure 11. When dropping, there is necessarily an effect
as at least the dropped payments fail. However, the fraction of
payments routed via the nodes with the highest betweenness
centrality are tiny in number in comparison to the scale-free
network. Hence, the effect of dropping only becomes visible
when a higher number of nodes is corrupted, as can be seen
in Figure 12 for 5%.
(a) Success ratio (b) Success ratio
(c) Total transacted amount (d) Total transacted amount
(e) Cumulat. transacted values (f) Cumulat. transacted values
Fig. 9: Griefing attack with attackers selected by highest
betweenness centrality. Run on Lightning topology. Speedy-
Murmurs on the left and Ford-Fulkerson on the right.
C. Incentives
As the network topology is an emergent phenomenon that
arises out of the individual choices of each participant in the
network vis-a´-vis whom each will open channels with, there
needs to be some way to guide network formation if a non-
scale-free structure is desired. We propose the use of incentives
to push participants into forming a more resilient topology.
We identify two points in a payment channel protocol
where applying incentives could achieve the desired result,
they are: payment execution and channel creation. During pay-
ment execution, transactions routed through highly connected
nodes would need to pay additional fees proportional to the
degree of those nodes. There are complications in enforcing
such a solution, however. Namely, in prior protocols, the nodes
themselves are in charge of deciding and enforcing their own
fees. It is unclear how a network would be able to enforce the
higher fees.
A more promising approach is to apply the penalty during
channel creation. Again, the penalty is proportional to the
degrees of the connected nodes. This penalty could be a
flat payment or it could be a forced over-collateraliztion. A
flat payment is the simplest solution, but may have uneven
effectiveness as nodes with more capital would be willing to
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(a) Node connections (b) Initial balances
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Fig. 10: Characteristics of Dataset 32. Details in Table I.
pay the penalty knowing that they will make it up over time
in routing fees, especially given that they may be part of more
paths if they are connected to a hub. Less wealthy nodes will
not pay the upfront costs and will therefore be deprived of
future income.
For the above reasons, we advocate the second option,
forced over-collateraliztion applied during channel creation.
In forced over-collateralization, a node locks up additional
collateral besides what they intend for the channel balance.
With over-collateralization, a node has an additional cost they
have to pay continuously over time; this is the opportunity
cost of locking up more collateral than if they had connected
to a more secluded node. An important caveat is that the
extra collateral above the desired channel balance cannot be
spendable; it can only be returned to its owner when the
channel is closed. This is to prevent a node from claiming
a lower collateral than it actually needs while knowing that
it will be forced by over-collateralization to lock a little bit
more, effectively negating the intended penalty. The function
for determining the amount to over-collateralize and its optimal
parameters are left to future work, as is comparison with the
flat payment method.
(a) Success ratio (b) Success ratio
(c) Total transacted amount (d) Total transacted amount
(e) Cumulat. transacted values (f) Cumulat. transacted values
Fig. 11: Mitigation against griefing by delaying with attackers
selected by highest betweenness centrality. Run on Dataset 32.
SpeedyMurmurs on the left and Ford-Fulkerson on the right.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We refer to an in-depth survey for a detailed review of
payment channel networks [19] and focus on the work related
to attacks and defense mechanisms.
Payment Griefing and Channel Exhaustion. Rohrer et
al. introduce various attacks on Lightning, namely denial-
of-service, channel exhaustion, payment griefing and node
isolation, as well as combinations of these [37]. The attacks
presented in [37] leverage the same broad ideas as ours but
focus on fundamentally different routing algorithms, datasets,
and threat model. They focus on the attacker initiating pay-
ments rather than affecting payments which they are on the
path of. Initiating a large number of payments is likely to
cause suspicion and hence our attacks are more stealthy. Our
attacker model is more realistic as well. Rohrer et al.’s node
isolation is not a practical attack; they assume a hub exists to
facilitate payments to other nodes, but in fact, the reason hubs
exist is to earn money through routing fees. Therefore, if an
adversary routes so many transactions through a hub that the
hub’s channels become exhausted, this will be prohibitively
expensive in terms of routing fees (a node would only put so
much currency up for collateral if they were going to make
a worthwhile profit off of it). It would also be unlikely to
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Fig. 12: Mitigation against dropping attack with attackers
selected by highest betweenness centrality. Run on Dataset 32.
SpeedyMurmurs on the left and Ford-Fulkerson on the right.
actually deplete the all channels as a rational node would
always be prepared to rebalance to make sure its collateral
is not unusable.
Our attack is more plausable because of nodes’ ability to
insert themselves arbitrarily in a topology [14], in addition
to infiltration and takeover being a constant threat for any
networked node.
Whereas the above attacks are all straight forward, Perez
et al. design and analyze a more effective payment griefing
attack [34]. However, this is not applicable for routing algo-
rithms where intermediaries make decisions about the paths.
The effects of payment griefing can be mitigated by re-
placing the HTLC protocol. Lightning’s current protocol might
lock a payment for time O(l∆) if the path length is l and an
upper bound for initiating a dispute is ∆. Several approaches
could reduce this maximal timeout [11], [28], [13]. As all
approaches still require timeouts in the order of minutes, our
griefing by delaying attack remains applicable.
Dropping and congestion. Dropping attacks have been
evaluated in the context of Lightning, finding that Lightning’s
hub and spoke topology as well as the predictable routing
algorithm results in a high rate of failed payments if attackers
are integrated into the network strategically [42]. The authors
propose randomization of the source routing algorithm to
increase resilience against such attacks. Another possibility to
reduce the impact of dropping is redundancy [5].
An alternative attack is network congestion [30]. In addi-
tion to the above attacks on Lightning, there are attacks on its
privacy, indicating that channel balances and payment relations
can be revealed [21], [41], [22].
IX. CONCLUSION
We examined the effectiveness of attacks against payment
channel networks that use local routing to complete transac-
tions. The performance of such routing algorithms degrades
gracefully when the number of randomly placed attackers
increases. However, they are highly vulnerable if the attacker
controls nodes of a high centrality and hence controls the
majority of paths. We propose to use routing fees to incentivize
payment channel networks to form with less central nodes and
more diverse paths.
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